The nation expected its Cold War Army to fight from its forward-based locations when the "balloon went up." The United States had a trained and ready "Band of Excellence" Army ready to fight on freedom's frontiers. It was a "good," efficient, and orderly Armya place for everything, and everything in its place.
The threat of annihilation by another nuclear armed superpower focused the Army on its mission as the "war winning" service of the US armed forces. When the Soviet Union crumbled, however, a new world emerged. With the end of the Cold War, the zero-sum game ended, and the era of high-intensity conflict -at least for the foreseeable future -ended as well. As the world's lone superpower -some have called the United States a "hyper-power" 1 -the United States has been able to flex its muscle without credible threats of retaliation. Emerging reality, however, has changed the core of the Army. Instead of its 2001purpose to "fight and win our Nation's wars," 2 the Army now has an operational concept with the imperative to "seize, retain and exploit the initiative." 3 Has the US Army lost its warrior ethos? Has being "bogged down" in nation-building, peacekeeping and other irregular warfare tasks at the low-intensity end of the spectrum of war -the segment of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorismeroded its "throat-grappling instinct" 4 ? This SRP analyzes this issue from the perspective of the Army's role in unifying the nation's 21 st century security efforts.
The U.S. Army has maintained its relevancy in the post-Cold War era by training for and engaging in the other forms of warfare that had little priority during the Cold War because it then focused mostly on the high-intensity Soviet threat. Future success for the U.S. Army will depend on its agility to effectively operate across the entire spectrum of warfare. The first -and most important -step in achieving this objective is to instill the appropriate mindset across the Army. This mindset must be instilled in every Soldier, from the most senior four-star general to the newest recruit. After years of organizing, training, and equipping large formations to operate as efficient and effective lethal combat units, the Army has begun to lead the charge in building teams throughout the Joint Force and in the Interagency and Intergovernmental organizations. The Army is re-learning many hard lessons from its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan about countering threats at the low-intensity segment of the war-fighting spectrum. This SRP argues that the most important recent lesson the Army has learned is the need to sustain unity of effort in low-intensity conflicts.
Unity of Effort
Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, defines unity of effort as the, "coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization -the product of successful unified action." 5 The same publication defines the related concept of unified action as "the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort." 6 Unity of effort is the end-state -or result -of unified action. Every Soldier should understand the intellectual underpinnings of this concept. This SRP describes these intellectual underpinnings and offers an intellectual framework to assist the practitioner in visualizing the conceptualization, formulation, and execution a plan of unified action that will produce unity of effort from the strategic level down to the tactical level. This framework is called the "War Prism."
The "War Prism" -Features
For the purposes of this paper, the "War Prism" is a traditional glass triangular prism -the kind that most high school physics students use to reflect and light ( Figure 1 ). For the purposes of this paper, the "War Prism" is a traditional glass triangular the kind that most high school physics students use to reflect and When white light passes through a prism, it is refracted or bent due to the changing medium through which it is passing ( Figure 2 ).
For the purposes of this paper, the "War Prism" is a traditional glass triangular the kind that most high school physics students use to reflect and disperse white s a common reference system for the "War Prism." The "War Prism," like the traditional triangular prism, consists of two triangular bases (Bases "A" and "B") and Science provides the basis of the "War Prism" logic, but it is in the prism's artful application that this logic will benefit the user. In order to establish the unique concept of the "War Prism," each of its key components will be defined to furt prism's usefulness in conceptualizing, formulating and executing a counterinsurgency strategy.
The Body -The Levels of War
The "War Prism's" body represents the three l Science provides the basis of the "War Prism" logic, but it is in the prism's artful application that this logic will benefit the user. In order to establish the unique concept of the "War Prism," each of its key components will be defined to furt prism's usefulness in conceptualizing, formulating and executing a counterinsurgency
The Levels of War
The "War Prism's" body represents the three levels of war ( Figure 3 )
In this case, light passes from air through glass. Depending on the entry angle of the two phenomena may occur. The light may be merely reflected back into the the angle is correct, the light may be dispersed into a . The "War Prism"
represents a nation. The Nation's strategy is the white light. If the nation applies the a dispersion of a rainbow of colors. If the nation does not apply strategy correctly, then the white light will merely be reflected as by providing
Science provides the basis of the "War Prism" logic, but it is in the prism's artful application that this logic will benefit the user. In order to establish the unique concept of the "War Prism," each of its key components will be defined to further establish the prism's usefulness in conceptualizing, formulating and executing a counterinsurgency ( Figure 3 ).
Doctrinal definitions do apply. FM 3 define and clarify the relationship between strategy, operational approach, and tactical actions. The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific levels of responsibility organize thought and approaches to a problem. distinguish between headquarters and the specific responsibilities and actions performed at each echelon.
The "War Prism," however, define and clarify the relationship between strategy, operational approach, actions. The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They specific levels of responsibility and planning. They help organize thought and approaches to a problem. The levels clearly distinguish between headquarters and the specific responsibilities and at each echelon. The "War Prism," however, transcends the FM 3-0 "snowman" chart displayed in Figure   Figure 4 . FM 3-0 Levels of War Chart
The purpose of the "War Prism" body then is to depict, separate, and distinguish the three levels of war so that they can be further analyzed. The purpose of the Unity of Effort lines is to ensure that all levels of war are nested. All Soldiers early in their careers learn the importance of knowing the missions at least twolevels up and two-levels down their chain of command. The "War Prism" presents a framework to visualize the nesting of these complex concepts from the strategic to the tactical levels. These Unity of Effort lines direct the strategist or tactician in a unified action -"the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort." 9 The strategist can now "travel" along these Unity of Effort lines throughout the levels of war to ensure that units are nesting to the correct concepts, missions, tasks, and purposes both up and down the chain of command. This ensures vertical nesting.
The next section will detail the concept of friction.
The "War Prism" -Friction
The concept of friction is also included in the "War Prism." As the high schooler's triangular prism's glass medium refracts the white light, so does the "War Prism's" medium refracts strategy as well. The "War Prism's" medium is called friction. Friction is "surface resistance to relative motion." 10 The "War Prism" depicts friction as those forces within the environment that reflect or disperse the strategy in use. An infinite number of forces will impact the strategy -some foreseen, some not. Some forces will impact positively and some will impact negatively. Some will cancel others out while yet others will dominate. The bottom line is that friction will impact the implemented strategy. Clausewitz' description of his concept of friction is apropos: "The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war." 11 Clausewitz goes on to assert that "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." 12 So it is that the "War Prism's" friction will also have a cumulative effect -either reflecting the strategy in use as white light -symbolizing defeat -or dispersing the strategy in use as a "rainbow" -symbolizing victory. Either way, the outcome of the strategy may not be what was first visualized at the beginning of the undertaking. Clearly defined end states and intermediate objectives along each Unity of Effort line, however, will help minimize the friction. The "War Prism" provides visibility to all levels of war.
The body of this prism is now constructed. It consists of three separate prisms that represent the three levels of war -strategic, operational and tactical -aligned end to end. The medium is called friction within which transverse many Unity of Effort lines.
The "War Prism" further defines these Unity of Effort lines by using its Base "B," but its
Base "A" helps set the conditions to do so.
Base "A" -The Remarkable Trinity Carl von Clausewitz explains his "remarkable trinity" as,
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. 13 The "War Prism" uses this "Remarkable Trinity" base to clearly identify the type of war to be fought. The first base of the "War Prism" -Base "A" -is Clausewitz' "remarkable"
or "paradoxical" trinity as depicted in Figure 6 . warfare separately from national policy."
continuum of war is expressed within the Remarkable Trinity.
The "War Prism" uses Base "A" the conflict that is being embarked upon. Base "A" also helps identi
Y-axes what type of unity of effort lines will emerge from each apex the military, and the people. In order to develop a comprehensive strategy to apply all the national means available, the strategist must "War Prism" links Base "A"
Mechanism -in order to do so.
Base "B" -The Defeat Mechanism
The US Army's Field Manual 3 11 diplomatic in nature involving political discourse more than the militaries or the people.
This highlights Clausewitz' famous assertion that "War is…a continuation of political intercourse by other means." 15 Mao adds that "There is no reason to consider guerilla warfare separately from national policy." 16 Arguably, both theorists agree that the entire continuum of war is expressed within the Remarkable Trinity.
The "War Prism" uses Base "A" -the Remarkable Trinity -to clearly understand the conflict that is being embarked upon. Base "A" also helps identi axes what type of unity of effort lines will emerge from each apex and the people. In order to develop a comprehensive strategy to apply all the national means available, the strategist must carefully think through each apex. The the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition…Defeat mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, they describe broad operational and tactical effects. Commanders must translate these effects into tactical tasks. Operational art formulates the most effective, efficient way to defeat enemy aims. 18 This component of the "War Prism" depicts the defeat mechanisms, which represent the effects needed to win the war (Figure 7 ). This triangle's apexes represent universal objectives required for victory in any war: 1) Dislocate the people, 2) Destroy the enemy, and 3) Deny the enemy the means to make war. Doctrinally, FM 3-0 lists four defeat mechanisms: 1) Destroy, 2) Dislocate, 3) Disintegrate, and 4) Isolate. 19 For the purposes of this paper, Disintegrate and Destroy are closely enough related and are combined under the "War Prism's" Destroy defeat mechanism. 20 Also FM 3-0's Isolate defeat mechanism is similar to the "War Prism's" Deny defeat mechanism; therefore they are combined under the Deny defeat mechanism. 21 Thus, the "War Prism"
consolidates the Army's four doctrinal defeat mechanisms into three: Dislocate, Destroy, and Deny.
Dislocate is defined as, "to put out of place." 22 For the purposes of the "War Prism", the term "dislocate" means to remove the people from the enemy's "place" and put them into the friendly "place" thereby relocating them -not physically, although at times that may need to be accomplished, but mentally -from the enemy's side to your side. Deny is defined commonly as, "to withhold the possession, use, or enjoyment of." 23 Deny in this defeat mechanism's triangle apex is exactly that -withholding from the enemy the possession, use, or enjoyment of the means to make war. Destroy has many definitions in the dictionary and all of them seem applicable -"to put an end to; extinguish; to kill; slay; to render ineffective or useless; nullify; neutralize; invalidate." Conceptually the "War Prism" is set. The first step in the application of the "War Prism,"
however, is correctly defining the imminent conflict.
"War Prism" Application
The first step is to identify the type of war. Clausewitz again sets the standard for this most important concept of identifying the true nature of the conflict, because only by doing so can the statesman decide upon a correct strategy. Accordingly, Clausewitz advises,
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. 25 Only by identifying the true nature of the war can the statesmen and strategists determine the correct strategy (way) that efficiently employs the available means to achieve the desired ends. Again, a correct application of the means to the ends will not links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose-cause and effect-to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Lines of effort are essential to operational design when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. 28 The Defeat Mechanism base's apexes, Dislocate and Deny, therefore utilize LOEs. 
Center of Gravity Analysis
If the nature of war is identified as a counterinsurgency then a distinction must be made between the roles and capabilities of the host nation and the assisting power. Prism" in viewing a counterinsurgency from the strategic level down to the tactical level. Figure 11 Using the Dislocation defeat mechanism at the every effort to assist the host nation to strengthen the legitimacy of its government by dislocating/separating the people from the insurgents and placing them on the side of the host nation. Programs must be put in reinforce the host nation's governing legitimacy. This is a whole approach because conflicts across the spectrum of war often need more than just The final defeat mechanism, the Destroy defeat mechanism at the strategic level will also use all elements of national power to attack with a more force-oriented focus.
Destroying the enemy is a more traditional military task, but at the strategic level other The true value of the "War Prism" resides in its potential to allow the strategist to conceptualize, formulate and execute a strategy from the strategic level down to the tactical level, rather than wandering around the "strategic abyss."
At no time is any one defeat mechanism apex ignored, because it is the systematic and combined application of national power with these effects in mind that allows the strategist and the tactician, together with the commander, to ensure that all of the means at their disposal are working in harmony to achieve the ends required for victory. If the true nature of the war lies within the Destroy effect apex, then a more military-centric solution is needed. If the true nature of the conflict lies within the Deny effect apex, then a more diplomatic -or political-centric solution will be required. War is the continuation of politics by other means, so politics also appears in our theoretical model -and would be near the top of the Deny effect apex. If the populace is the center of gravity in an insurgency, then a strategy focused on separating the people from the insurgency should be adopted. The "War Prism" dictates that all lines of operation and effort are applied. This recalls the concept of mass -not a massing of tanks on the objective, but a massing of effects against the enemy's critical vulnerability.
Conclusion
The "War Prism" accounts for the nature of war and aids in the correct formulation and application of strategy to fight wars in order to achieve political objectives. By thinking through this theoretical model, the practitioner is forced to identify the true nature of the conflict, the appropriate defeat mechanisms, and then apply all elements of national power in an effects based strategy to effectively and efficiently use the available means to achieve the desired ends. This is a difficult and To be sure, Clausewitz believed all wars were things of the same nature. However, that nature was like the nature of the weather, dynamic, and its principal elements, even if always present, were constantly in flux. Like war, the weather consists of a few common and inescapable elements, such as barometric pressure, heat index, dew point, wind velocity, and so on. Nevertheless, the difference between a brief summer shower and a hurricane is significant, so much so, in fact, that we prepare for each quite differently. Indeed, the difference in degree is so great, the danger to our lives and property so much higher in the latter, that we might do well to consider showers and hurricanes different in kind, though both are certainly stormy weather. We might apply some of the same rules of thumb for each kind of weather, but also many different ones.
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The Remarkable Trinity covers the entire spectrum of war from high-intensity to lowintensity. War is like the weather. We can hope for good weather, and we can hope for a good war -a type of war that we are prepared to fight. In the end, though, we have the weather that we have, and we have the war that we have as well. We should not wear shorts and sandals in a blizzard, nor should we apply solely high-intensity means to a counterinsurgency. We must first correctly identify the type -or nature -of the war we are fighting. Then and only then can we determine the correct ways (strategy/tactics) to wage the war with the means at hand to achieve effectively and efficiently the desired ends. The "War Prism" provides a template for strategists, planners, and commanders to visualize the "unity of effort" that they are building in their campaign design from the strategic to the tactical levels. The "War Prism" enables them to fully visualize the campaign's focus and linkage to strategic objectives in a coherent whole-of-government approach. By thinking through the Remarkable Trinity base to determine the correct nature of the conflict and then thinking through the Defeat Mechanism base of effects desired to be applied toward a center of gravity through specific LOOs and LOEs, a truly whole-of-government campaign can be designed that coordinates, integrates, and focuses the efforts of not only the military but also the intergovernmental and interagency. Unity of effort is thereby achieved. As light passing through a glass prism at the correct entry angle is dispersed into a beautiful rainbow, so it is with strategy when applied correctly through the "War Prism." Endnotes
